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Tennessee v. Garner. Invoking the Fourth
Amendment to Limit Police Use of Deadly
Force
I. Introduction
A burglary call responded to by two Memphis, Tennessee
police officers on October 3, 1974, resulted in the death of a
young fleeing felon, Eugene Garner. Garner's father initiated
suit against the city of Memphis and the officers and their
superiors alleging violation of Garner's fourth,1 fifth,2 sixth,3
eighth,' and fourteenth' amendment constitutional rights.
Eleven years later the United States Supreme Court held6 that,
on the facts of this case, the amount of force used against Gar-
ner by Officers Hymon and Wright constituted an unreasonable
seizure in violation of Garner's fourth amendment rights.7 More
importantly, the Court affirmed the circuit court and held that
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on... indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697 (1985).
7. Id. at 1706.
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the Tennessee statute,8 which authorized police use of deadly
force against fleeing felons, was unconstitutional because it au-
thorized the use of deadly force against an apparently unarmed,
nondangerous fleeing suspect.9 Because there were no restric-
tions on the scope of the privilege to use deadly force, the Court
concluded that the statute gave the police impermissibly broad
discretion in the use of deadly force.10 The law failed to strike a
delicate balance between the individual's interest and the state's
interest. In addition, the Court did not find the state's interest
sufficient to justify the taking of a suspect's life." Finally, the
Court rejected a long tradition of case law which validated the
common law deadly force rule. 2 Thus, when examined in to-
day's legal and technological context,13 the Court found that a
literal application of the statute was invalid."
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) (recodifying TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808
(1975)) provides: "If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee
or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest."
Subsequent to the decision in this case, the Tennessee statute was amended. It now
reads as follows:
(a) If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flees or forci-
bly resists, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), deadly force is authorized to effect an arrest
only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted, and,
where feasible, warning has been given the defendant, by identifying himself or
herself as such officer, or an oral order to halt, or an oral warning that deadly force
might be used, and:
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe defendant has committed a fel-
ony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to the
officer or to any person in the presence of the officer; or
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others unless he is im-
mediately apprehended.
(c) All law enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by the fore-
going provisions and shall receive instruction regarding implementation of same in
law enforcement training programs. [Code 1858, § 5040; Shan., § 7000; Code 1932,
§ 11539; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 40-808; Acts 1985, ch. 359, § 1.]
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (Supp. 1986).
9. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701.
10. Id. at 1698.
11. Id. at 1699-1701.
12. Id. See also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
13. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1703-05 (the Court made an examination of the legal and
technological changes).
14. Id. at 1707.
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Tennessee v. Garner,15 is the first instance in which a state
deadly force statute has been held unconstitutional on fourth
amendment grounds. It sets a new tone for constitutional chal-
lenges to police conduct. For this reason the case provides an
important and interesting focus for in depth analysis.
Part II of this Note presents the history and background of
both the fourth amendment and deadly force statutes. This sec-
tion also examines the pertinent constitutional challenges to
deadly force statutes. Part III reviews the factual and procedural
aspects of Garner. Part IV sets forth the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court. Part V analyzes the majority de-
cision and suggests that the Court improperly assessed the rele-
vant factors in reaching its decision. Finally, Part VI concludes
that the majority adopted too restrictive a standard for police
use of deadly force.
II. Background
A. The Fourth Amendment
1. Purpose and Scope
The authorities agree that the basic purpose of the fourth
amendment is to protect the personal security, 16 privacy, 17 and
dignity 8 of individuals from arbitrary intrusion by government
officials.' 9 It has been called a concrete expression of a right "ba-
15. 105 S. Ct. 1694.
16. "Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry . Davis v. Missis-
sippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
17. "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of
this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by governmental officials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
18. "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal pri-
vacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
19. While the fourth amendment is often spoken of as a protection against unrea-
sonable police intrusions, it is important to note that the amendment restrains the activ-
ities of more than just the police; its protections extend to the conduct of all government
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (postal inspector);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (government surveil-
lances ordered by the President); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents); Camara, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (municipal code enforcement officer).
1986]
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sic to [a] free society. '20 Unquestionably, the amendment ad-
dresses itself to police activity and functions as a restraint
thereon.2 1
The scope of the fourth amendment is limited to searches22
and seizures.2 s It is said to provide a two-part protection. 2' The
language in the first clause of the amendment prohibits unrea-
20. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968). The Court stated that "the authority of the
police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed
to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). See generally 2 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 214 (1978). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). Amsterdam states: "I continue to believe that the limits of
American society's effective control over the largest part of the spectrum of police pow-
ers and potential abuses depend upon the scope given to the fourth amendment." Id. at
377.
Professor Amsterdam considers the fourth amendment the most comprehensive
source of constitutional limitation on police activity. He recognizes that the first, fifth,
sixth and fourteenth amendments also serve as a restraint on some police activities but
explains that because they address the abuse of individual rights within the judicial sys-
tem as well, those other amendments fall short of providing the scope of protection
against police intrusions which the fourth amendment affords to individuals. A result,
according to Amsterdam, is that "notwithstanding all of them, an enormous range of
police power stands unrestrained and subject to abuse." Id. at 378. A review of recent
Supreme Court and courts of appeals rulings, which have curtailed the scope of these
amendments, illustrates the inadequate protection of the public against abusive police
conduct, absent the fourth amendment.
22. A search is defined as a governmental intrusion into an area in which an individ-
ual has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Frequently, it is a fine line distinguishing an intrusion from a search. Compare
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (physical touching of body or clothing which causes
hidden objects to be revealed constitutes a search) with Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971) (request that an individual turn over a hidden object does not
constitute a search).
23. A person has been "seized" if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasona-
ble individual would not believe herself free to go. Thus, when an officer has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen by a show of authority or use of physical force, the
officer has "seized" the person. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428
(1976) (arrest is "quintessentially a seizure"); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973)
(a seizure is any detention of an individual against her will); Davis, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27
(1969) ("investigatory detentions" are seizures for fourth amendment purposes).
24. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980) ("As it was ultimately
adopted, however, the Amendment contained two separate clauses, the first protecting
the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requir-




sonable searches and seizures;5 police searches and seizures in-
fringing on protected interests are violative of the fourth amend-
ment only if they are unreasonable.26 A necessary corollary of
this principle is that there will be justifiable intrusions.2 7 The
second protection incorporated in the more specific clause of the
fourth amendment provides that searches and seizures must be
conducted under a warrant based on probable cause.2 8 The war-
rant procedure requires that the warrant be issued by a "de-
tached and neutral" magistrate29 and state with particularity
the persons and places to be seized and searched.30 Deviation
25. For the full text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 1.
26. The Supreme Court has stated that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function
is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.") Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 768.
27. Just exactly what is a "justifiable" intrusion is not evident from the literature
and case law. However, a balancing test has been adopted as the means for analyzing the
constitutionality of conduct under the fourth amendment. According to the Terry Court,
this test has three parts. First, one must identify the governmental interests that justi-
fied the intrusion and the specific facts which, when combined with reasonable infer-
ences, justify the intrusion. Second, one must establish "the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's rights." Lastly, the identified interests must be balanced
against one another to determine if the need to search or seize justified the intrusion.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27 (1968). See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text for a more
illustrative discussion of the balancing test.
28. See supra note 1 for the full text of the fourth amendment.
29. The importance of requiring that a "detached and neutral" magistrate issue a
warrant cannot be overstated. The significance of the magistrate requirement has been
explained on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's dis-
interested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in mak-
ing a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and
leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers .... When
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). But see 2 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note
21, at 29-41, 230-31 (LaFave commented that, based on empirical studies, there is reason
to question the assumption that judicial authorization beforehand necessarily affords
greater protection of fourth amendment rights. He observes that magistrates often act as
a "rubber stamp" for police without engaging in meaningful and neutral examination of
the complaint.).
30. A statement of the items or persons to be searched or seized is required by the
1986]
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from this rule is permitted only in a few carefully drawn
exceptions. 1
There are valid reasons why searches and seizures made
pursuant to a warrant are the preferred course of action.32 The
determination of probable cause by an impartial judicial officer
is considered more likely to maximize fourth amendment protec-
tion of the individual's privacy than if judgment was made "by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
express language of the amendment. For the full text of the fourth amendment, see
supra note 1.
The historical root of this requirement can be traced back to the period when the
general warrant or writ of assistance provided state officials with an unrestrained license
to invade an individual's property or person. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-86
(1965). Today, warrants not complying with the specificity requirements make a subse-
quent search or seizure illegal. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325-
27 (1979) (open-ended warrant violated specificity provisions of warrant requirement);
Stanford, 379 U.S. at 480 (warrant was invalidated on the ground that it was too general
when 2000 items, unrelated to the purpose of the warrant, were seized pursuant to the
warrant).
31. The routine, general border search is one category of searches excepted from the
warrant requirement. Another is the exigent circumstances or emergency situation in
which it is impractical to secure a warrant before conducting the search or seizure. Am-
sterdam, supra note 21, at 358-60, nn.102-26. For case law discussing exigent circum-
stances, see, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (The Court refused to find
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search at the scene of a homicide which
lasted for four days and resulted in the seizure of 200-300 objects because, "[tihere was
no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time re-
quired to obtain a search warrant."); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976)
(The warrantless arrest of a suspect who retreated into the vestibule of her house was
upheld where the police not only had probable cause to arrest but there was "a realistic
expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence."); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (where suspected arrested felon entered house moments
before the police arrived, a warrantless search of house was upheld because of the poten-
tial danger posed to the officers' lives and the threat that the suspect would escape or
resist). See also Larkin, Exigent Circumstances For Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 ARIz.
L. REV. 1171, 1184 (1981) (identifying four situations where exigent circumstances for
home arrests arise: (1) hot pursuit; (2) destruction of evidence; (3) possibility of violence;
and (4) possibility of flight).
32. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) ("[W~e have expressed a strong
preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under
a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail.' ") (citing United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)).
Judicial attitudes expressing the significance of obtaining warrants is clear as posses-
sion of a warrant by an officer greatly reduces the perception of unlawful police action.
The warrant assures a person of the officer's lawful authority, his need to search, and the
limits of that power. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/4
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ing out crime." 33 However, the issuance of a warrant does not
automatically validate a search or seizure. The Supreme Court
has recognized that warrants and the magistrates issuing them
are not infallible. 4 The Court will invalidate warrants not com-
porting with the essential elements of the warrant
requirement.3 5
2. Fourth Amendment Requirements
As the language of the amendment clearly states,36 warrants
must be supported by a showing of probable cause. 7 However,
the probable cause requirement must be met even when a war-
rant is not secured.38 Thus, when an officer conducts a search or
33. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
34. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 24 (1925) (The Court recognizes that
searches and seizures are not necessarily reasonable when made under warrants because
they could have been issued for improper purposes.). Among the reasons for an invalid
warrant are the failure of the magistrate to retain her detached and neutral status, fail-
ure of the warrant to include a particular statement of the items and persons to be
searched or seized, failure to articulate facts and circumstances that establish probable
cause, and knowing misstatements of facts. See infra note 52 and the case cited therein
for an instance where a warrant was improperly issued.
35. These elements, set out in the second clause of the fourth amendment, are prob-
able cause, review of the warrant affidavit by a detached and neutral magistrate, and
specific identification of the items and persons to be searched or seized.
36. For the full text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 1.
37. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer lead a
prudent person to believe that the offense has been, or is being, committed. Beck, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
The value of the probable cause standard is well stated in Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949): "The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating... often oppos-
ing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less
would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Id.
at 176.
The need for the affidavit to contain a statement of articulated facts and circum-
stances in order to establish probable cause is paramount. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[Pirobable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.") (emphasis added).
A frequently debated issue in the context of a probable cause discussion centers on
whether the same quantum of proof is needed to establish probable cause as is needed to
prove criminal guilt. The Court has clearly stated that the two are different and require
different levels of proof. Thus, evidence insufficient to establish guilt is not automatically
insufficient to establish probable cause. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 172-73.
38. See generally Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959) (The crucial
question in the warrantless arrest was whether there was probable cause to believe the
7
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seizure in the absence of a warrant, the officer must present to a
magistrate tle facts and circumstances that constitute probable
cause to believe that the suspect was engaging in criminal con-
duct. The Supreme Court has held that in order for the police
officer's conduct to withstand fourth amendment challenges
there must be a showing of probable cause made shortly after
the search or seizure.39
Probable cause is an objectively determined standard.'0 It
petitioners were violating or had violated the narcotics law. If they were, the warrantless
arrest was legal); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) (Prohibition of-
ficers acquired information concerning the transportation of contraband liquor. Based
upon this information, the officers conducted a warrantless search of a car on a highway.
The highway was frequently used in the illegal transportation of liquor. The Court held
that the measure of the legality of the seizure depended on whether the officers had
probable cause to believe the automobile had contraband liquor in it and whether the
liquor was being illegally transported.); Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1955):
But, if officers can arrest without a warrant and never be required to disclose the
facts upon which they based their belief of probable cause - if, in other words,
they have an untouchable power to arrest without a warrant, - why would they
ever bother to get a warrant? And the same obvious conclusion follows if the
courts, when an arrest is attacked as illegal, will assume, without facts, that an
arrest without a warrant was for probable cause. To strike down all factual re-
quirements in respect to probable cause for arrests without a warrant, while main-
taining them for the issuance of a warrant, would be to blast one of the support
columns of justice by law.
Id. at 559-60. For a more in-depth discussion of probable cause, see infra notes 40-44.
39. "-rstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (In cases of warrantless arrests, all persons
have a right to a judicial hearing for a determination of probable cause when extended
restraints on the individual's liberty follow the arrest. The standard needed is that there
was probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime.). See generally 2 W.R.
LAFAvE, supra note 21, at 244-52 (discussing the need for prompt judicial review of war-
rantless arrests as provided for in Gerstein and questioning whether, in fact, such re-
quirement is conscientiously followed by courts).
40. Beck, 379 U.S. at 97 ("If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ("[G]ood faith on the part of the arresting officers
is not enough."). But see Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) where it was held that an
officer's good faith reliance on a warrant based on a magistrate's determination of proba-
ble cause may not trigger exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant where
the warrant is later found invalid, providing the officer's reliance is objectively reasona-
ble and the application for the warrant was supported by more than just a bare bones
affidavit. The Court limited the scope of this good faith exception to situations address-
ing whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied in unconstitutional searches
and seizures. The Court was not intending to suggest a lowering of the probable cause
standard. Thus, this decision did not conflict with the cases discussed above which dealt
with the good faith belief of officers that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/4
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exists where the facts and circumstances known by the officer,
and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient on their own to lead a reasonably prudent person
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.1
When a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant the
officer at the scene determines whether there is probable cause.42
As previously noted however, searches and seizures are generally
performed pursuant to a warrrant,43 with a "detached and neu-
tral" magistrate determining probable cause.44
Notwithstanding the fourth amendment warrant and proba-
ble cause requirements, the constitutional minimum for all
searches and seizures is "reasonableness.' 45 The task of articu-
lating a definition of reasonableness has plagued the courts from
the fourth amendment's inception. 46 Due to the magnitude of
police activities, 7 the formulation of a comprehensive definition
of reasonableness is considered unrealistic and impractical. As a
consequence, the reasonableness of police conduct has come to
be determined on a case-by-case basis. The facts and circum-
Id. at 915 n.13. After Leon, probable cause was still a minimum constitutional require-
ment for a legal search or seizure.
41. See supra note 37.
42. 2 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 225.
43. For those unusual circumstances when a warrant is not required for a legal
search or seizure, see supra note 31. The courts have repeatedly stated that searches and
seizures conducted in the absence of a warrant are the exception, not the rule. Unless
exigent circumstances are shown, a warrant based on probable cause is needed for a legal
search or seizure. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 474-75 (searches and seizures without a war-
rant are per se unreasonable unless police can show that they fall into one of the care-
fully defined exceptions based on exigent circumstances).
44. See supra note 29. After reviewing a sworn affidavit containing a statement of
facts, the magistrate decides whether a reasonably prudent person would believe there
was probable cause to arrest or search based on the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular situation. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
45. For the full text of the fourth amendment, the first clause of which requires that
all searches and seizures be reasonable, see supra note 1.
46. "Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court." Camara, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
This definitional problem has plagued scholars as well as the courts. For a compre-
hensive review of the fourth amendment and the development of its black letter law, see
generally Amsterdam, supra note 21.
47. For a partal list of activities and duties which comprise a police officer's job, see
Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 381.
9
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stances of each case become the focal point of analysis in deter-
mining whether particular police conduct was reasonable.4
Despite these definitional problems, certain principles have
evolved that give shape to the reasonableness standard. A gov-
erning principle, recognized for years, is that warrantless
searches and seizures on private property are per se unreasona-
ble.49 That is not to say, however, that absent a warrant, a
search or seizure is always unreasonable. In instances when a
search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the reasonable-
ness of the conduct depends upon the scope of the intrusion and
the exigencies of the situation.50 When the degree of the intru-
sion is tailored to fit the need for the invasion, a reasonable,
though warrantless, search or seizure may be permissible.51
48. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140-42 (1978) (Government inter-
ception of phone calls made by defendant in a public phone booth was reasonable be-
cause invasion was minimized by interception of only defendant's calls. Motives of
agents were immaterial to a determination of reasonableness because the degree of the
intrusions was limited to meet the needs of the search.); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969) (A search of the individual and the area under his immediate control,
incident to a valid arrest, was reasonable because it was necessary for the officer to pro-
tect her own safety.); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (Bodily intrusions, because they involve a
greater degree of invasion of the person, require a higher level of reasonableness. Here,
the taking of a blood sample, after arrest for drunk driving, was reasonable because the
alcohol level in the blood decreases soon after drinking stops.).
49. Payton, 445 U.S. 573. The Court recognizes a difference between searches and
seizures on private property as opposed to those made on public property. The two have
come to be treated differently. In Watson, 423 U.S. 411, the Court upheld a warrantless
seizure in a public place though the officers had time to secure a warrant. The officers, on
the basis of an informant's tip, had probable cause to believe the defendant had stolen
credit cards in his possession at the time of the arrest. Recognizing that obtaining a
warrant was a preferred course of action, the Court, nonetheless, refused to transform
the judicial preference into a constitutional standard for searches and seizures on public
property. Id. at 423. Instead, it relied on the common law rule that a warrantless arrest
in a public place was valid if the officer had probable cause to believe the suspect was a
felon. Furthermore, the Court took notice of the continued adoption of the common law
rule in many states. Id. at 421-22. The Court upheld the seizure.
In distinguishing Watson, the Court in Payton relied on the private character of the
property, to wit, the home. Because the intrusion in Payton entailed violation of the
privacy of the individual and the sanctity of the home, the Court held, "[a]bsent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Pay-
ton, 445 U.S. at 590.
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18 n.15.
51. Id. at 29-30. In Terry, the Court held that Officer McFadden's temporary de-
tainment and pat-down search of the defendant was reasonable. The defendant's suspi-
cious conduct alerted the officer's attention. The subsequent seizure and search, because
they were limited to the need for the officer to protect the safety of the public and him-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/4
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Failure to comply with the fourth amendment requirements
invalidates the search or seizure,52 and evidence derived from
the illegality may be excluded 53 from the trial regardless of its
relevance and trustworthiness." These fourth amendment re-
quirements are made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.5 Thus, the conduct of state government of-
ficials must undergo the same scrutiny for reasonableness as
that of federal officials.
self, were reasonable.
52. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 325-27 (warrant invalidated because the jus-
tice who issued the warrant did not perform as a detached and neutral magistrate and
because the warrant was open-ended, thereby, violating the fourth amendment require-
ment that warrants state with particularity the persons and places to be searched or
seized).
53. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that excludes the products
of unreasonable searches and seizures from admission to evidence. It is the primary in-
strument for enforcing the fourth amendment and is intended to deter officers from con-
ducting unreasonable searches and seizures. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The rule is equally applicable to the states. "[A]II evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Not all searches and seizures failing to comply with the fourth amendment necessa-
rily result in the exclusion of evidence, however. Recently, the Court, in Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984), created an exception to the general rule that fruits of an illegal search or
seizure are inadmissible at trial. Here, the officers secured a facially valid search warrant
from a detached and neutral magistrate. The suspect sought to exclude the evidence as
fruits of an illegal search. The court of appeals, affirming the district court, granted the
motion to suppress on the grounds that the magistrate improperly issued the warrant
because the affidavit did not show probable cause. The lower court criticized the affidavit
because it did not establish the credibility of the informant from whom the officers re-
ceived information, nor did it set forth other facts to establish probable cause.
The Supreme Court reversed the order to suppress, creating an exception to the
exclusionary rule based on the officer's good faith belief in the validity of the warrant.
The Court reasoned that to exclude the evidence when an officer reasonably believed he
was conducting himself legally would not further the objective of the exclusionary
rule - to deter officers from violating the fourth amendment proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 916-17. See generally Wasserstrom & Mertens,
The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
85 (1984).
54. Davis, 394 U.S. at 724. Here the Court rejected the state's argument that finger-
prints are excepted from the exclusionary rule because they are a trustworthy piece of
evidence. The fingerprints, obtained in the course of an illegal seizure, were ordered ex-
cluded from the evidence and Davis' conviction was reversed. Id. at 728.
55. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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3. Constitutional Analysis Under the Fourth Amendment:
The Balancing Test
Any constitutional challenge to a police action requires an
analysis of the reasonableness of the conduct. Reasonableness
does not readily lend itself to an exacting definition because it
must be assessed according to the facts and circumstances of
each situation.5 6 To determine the reasonableness, the Court
balances the interests of the government and those of the indi-
vidual.57 Through its balancing, the Court determines whether
the need to seize the person or property and the degree of gov-
ernmental intrusion justify the resulting invasion of the individ-
ual's interests.58
In the area of constitutional challenges to state deadly force
statutes, identifying the state's interests and assigning a weight
to them has become a major obstacle in implementing the bal-
ancing test.59 Recognizing the difficulty in delineating state in-
terests, one court has identified protection of the public's per-
sonal security and preservation of the criminal justice system's
effectiveness and integrity as governmental interests."0 Protec-
tion of police officers from unreasonable risks in an already dan-
gerous profession is another."1 Further, commentators have iden-
56. See supra note 48 and cases cited therein.
57. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27; Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39. For an illustration of
this balancing test see infra notes 58-68.
58. For an application of this test see, e.g., Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700 (1985)
(state interest in effective law enforcement does not outweigh individual's interest in
life); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1019 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam
sub nom., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
59. Some cases dealing with deadly force in which the balancing test has been im-
plemented show that courts do not always identify the same state interests. See, e.g.,
Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700 (1985) (effective law enforcement and securing peaceful
submission of felons); Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1252 (6th Cir.
1977) (protect citizens against danger posed by felons), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1978);
Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1023 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting) (effective law enforcement, apprehen-
sion of criminals, prevention of crime and protection of members of general populace).
See generally Comment, The Use of Deadly Force to Arrest: Conflicting and Uncertain
Standards in the Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Use of
Deadly Force to Arrest] (examining the difficulty with identifying state and individual
interests). See also infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
60. Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1023 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
61. Terry, 392 U.S. 1. "American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence,
and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of




tified the state's interests in maintaining the effectiveness of the
arrest process,62 the protection of personal property, 3 and the
negative impact of crime on the individual and the community"
as legitimate governmental interests. Alternatively, identifying
the individual's interests has posed less of a problem. As the
Constitution expressly provides65 and as the case law recognizes,
the interests of the individual generally include an interest in
life, liberty, and property.6
Beyond these identification obstacles there is disagreement
among the courts as to the "weight" to be assigned to each of
the interests for balancing purposes. One view urges that the
state's duty to protect the public's personal security is para-
mount,6 7 while another argues that the individual's right to life
is fundamental and should prevail over all other interests.6 " Un-
avoidably, the problems associated with implementing the bal-
ancing test have increased the difficulty in developing a harmo-
nious and consistent constitutional assessment of police
conduct.6 '
B. Deadly Force Statutes
1. Common Law Origin
The privilege to use deadly force, incorporated in present
day deadly force statutes, originated in the common law.70 The
cornerstone of the common law rule was a distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors. 71 Deadly force could be used against
62. See Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MICH. L. REv. 448, 466-
67 (1940).
63. See generally Bohlen & Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property By Dangerous
Barriers and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L.J. 525 (1926).
64. Comment, Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 59, at 680.
65. For the relevant text of the fourteenth amendment see supra note 5.
66. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700; Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1017.
The Supreme Court has often spoken of the rights to life and liberty as fundamental
human rights. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 123 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concur-
ring); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
67. This was the position held by the court in Wiley, 548 F.2d at 1252.
68. This position was taken by the Eighth Circuit in Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1017.
69. See Comment, Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 59, at 680.
70. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
71. See Note, Justifiable Use of Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutory Survey, 12
1986]
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any fleeing felon if necessary to effect an arrest.7 2 At no time,
however, could such force be used against a misdemeanant.I
The rationale behind this rule rested upon the fact that all
felonies at common law were punishable by death. 4 When
deadly force was used to capture fleeing felons it was merely
considered an acceleration of the penal process. 5 The rationale
of the rule was further substantiated by the fact that there was
no effective police force network.7 6 If a felon initially eluded cap-
ture, it usually meant there would never be an arrest. In addi-
tion, before the development of revolvers and other advanced
weaponry, police officers had rudimentary weapons to use for
protection. Thus, arrests were usually procured in hand-to-hand
combat.7 These realities accented the need for some means to
facilitate capture on the first effort. Deadly force was the tool
WM. & MARY L. REV. 67, 68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Justifiable Use of Deadly Force].
72. For cases and further commentary interpreting the common law, see, e.g., Mar-
tyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 136
S.E. 375 (1927); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1922). See also 2 HALE, His-
TORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85-86 (1788) (deadly force allowed to effect the arrest
of a fleeing felon); BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 290-93 (Garland ed. 1978) (reprint of 9th
ed. 1783) (announcing the imperative that upon the commission of a felony, hue and cry
shall be raised upon the felons and all means necessary be used to capture the felons).
See generally Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the Constitu-
tion, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1980); Comment, Deadly Force To Arrest: Triggering Consti-
tutional Review, 11 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Deadly
Force].
73. For cases and commentary stating this principle, see United States v. Clark, 31
F. 710, 713 (E.D. Mich. 1887) (dictum); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879). See also
Note, Legalized Murder Of A Fleeing Felon, 15 VA. L. REV. 582 (1929) [hereinafter cited
as Legalized Murder].
74. For sources discussing this rationale see Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 138 (2d
Cir. 1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); BLACKSTONE,
supra note 72, at 94; Sherman, supra note 72, at 74; Deadly Force, supra note 72, at 365;
Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, supra note 71, at 68; Legalized Murder, supra note 73,
at 583.
There is some disagreement about what crimes were felonies at common law. Com-
pare Jones, 528 F.2d at 138 (arson, burglary, robbery, rape, murder and manslaughter)
with Mattis, 547 F.2d at 1011 n.7 (sodomy, larceny, mayhem and prison break also
listed). See also Legalized Murder, supra note 73, at 583 (the test for a felony was the
penal consequence of forfeiture of land or goods).
75. "It was considered dangerous to allow a felon to be at large; and in committing a
felony, the actor forfeited his right to life. The extirpation was but a premature execu-
tion of the inevitable judgment." Legalized Murder, supra note 73, at 583 (footnote
omitted).
76. See Sherman, supra note 72, at 74.
77. Id. at 74-75.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/4
TENNESSEE v. GARNER
chosen to effectuate immediate apprehension.
In the late nineteenth century, changes in the criminal law
and in technology brought the rationale supporting the common
law rule into doubt.78 First, there was an increase in the number
of crimes labelled felonies and a corresponding decrease in the
use of capital punishment as a sanction.7 9 Second, there was a
sophistication in the weaponry available to police. In the 1850's,
police began to carry revolvers as their standard weapon, so of-
ficers no longer had to subdue felony suspects in hand-to-hand
combat.80 Third, an expansive police force network was begin-
ning to take shape. Communication between agencies from city
to city was becoming commonplace.8 1 The combined effect of
these changes led to a deterioration of the common law
rationale.8 2
Some courts were sensitive to the deterioration of the com-
mon law rationale and expressed an interest in modifying the
rule.83 In United States v. Clark,8 4 the court hypothesized that
an officer would not be justified in using deadly force against an
individual suspected of committing the felony of petit larceny;
such severe force was disproportionate to the magnitude of the
offense.8 5 Two years later, in Reneau v. State,8 6 the issue of
deadly force against suspects of lesser felonies was again raised.
78. Id. at 75-76.
79. Id. See, e.g., Watson, 423 U.S. at 440-41 n.9 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(examples of common law misdemeanors which are now felonies: bribery, perjury, for-
gery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and assault with intent to rape); Storey v. State,
71 Ala. 329, 341 (1882) (petty larceny made a felony); See also Deadly Force, supra note
72, at 366; Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, supra note 71, at 70-71; Legalized Murder,
supra note 73, at 584 (new felonies have been created by legislation, many of which are
not punishable by death).
80. For a more in depth discussion of the impact that sophistication of weaponry
had on the common law rule, see Sherman, supra note 72, at 75.
81. Id. at 76.
82. Because not all felonies carried the sanction of death, it no longer made sense to
perceive deadly force as merely an acceleration of the penal process. Danger to officers
was reduced because they could shoot from a distance. Finally, the probability that an
escaping felon would never be captured decreased as a consequence of the improved
communication system among police agencies and the sophistication of apprehension
techniques. Id.
83. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
84. 31 F. 710 (E.D. Mich. 1887).
85. Id. at 713.




The court in Reneau concluded, that in certain felony circum-
stances, it would be better to allow escape than to take a life.8 7
Shortly after these changes in the law, changes in technology
emerged, accompanied by a change in judicial perspective on the
use of deadly force. In addition, the legislatures of various states
began to reconsider the issue of deadly force.'8
2. Statutory Response
Today almost all states have some rule limiting the use of
deadly force by police, created either by legislation or judicial
interpretation. While there is no uniformity among the states,
these rules can be essentially grouped into three categories.8 9
Statutes codifying the common law rule authorize the use of
deadly force to effect the arrest of fleeing felony suspects regard-
less of the felony committed.90 Presently, twenty-four states
adopt this form of a deadly force statute.91
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
89. These three categories are (1) codification of the common law; (2) Model Penal
Code approach; and (3) forcible or dangerous felony approach. See generally Justifiable
Use of Deadly Force, supra note 71.
90. Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, supra note 71, at 72-75.
Tennesssee's deadly force statute is one example of a codification of the common
law. For the text of the statute, see supra note 8.
91. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b)(1) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-510(2) (1977);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-22(c)(2) (1958); FLA. STAT. § 776.05 (1981); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-610 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1) (Supp.
1972-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.046(3)(2)(A) (VERNON 1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.140(3) (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6(c) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 732(3)
(West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.239(1)(d) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-9 (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAW ANN. § 22-16-32(2) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.16.040(3) (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45(4) (West 1982).
California has codified the common law rule but courts have construed it narrowly
to include only violent felonies. See, e.g., Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 26 (Cal. App. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 196(3) (West 1970). Indiana has also codi-
fied the common law rule but an Indiana state court has restricted the common law
statute to a standard similar to the one in the Model Penal Code. See Rose v. State, 431
N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ind. App. 1982) (deadly force was only justified to prevent injury or
threatened use of force but not to prevent an escape); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-3(b)(2)
(Burns 1985).
The following states have no deadly force statute but follow the felony/misdemeanor
distinction characteristic of the common law rule: Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Ohio,
Virginia, and West Virginia. South Carolina has no justifiable homicide law but it has a
statute allowing citizens to use deadly force to apprehend a suspected felon at night. S.C.




In response to concern over the improvident use of deadly
force by police, the American Law Institute proposed a second,
more restrictive rule limiting the use of deadly force in the
Model Penal Code.92 This rule authorizes the use of deadly force
only when the arrest is for a felony and the officer believes that
the suspected felon has either committed a crime involving
deadly force or presents a threat of substantial bodily harm if
not apprehended immediately.93 Fifteen states presently adopt
some version of the Model Penal Code.9 4
The third, most restrictive rule defining the use of deadly
force authorizes the privilege to use deadly force only in in-
stances when the felony committed threatens deadly harm."'
This type of statute lists the felonies under which the
privilege is allowed.' It is the least popular among state
92. See Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 59, at 662 (citing MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.07 comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958)). This same concern is again repeated
in MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 comment 3 (1962).
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) provides in relevant part:
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: (i) the
arrest is for a felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as
a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as
a peace officer; and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no sub-
stantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (A) the
crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or
threatened use of deadly force; or (B) there is a substantial risk that the person to
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(i), (iv)(A) and (B) (1962).
94. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a) (1985); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-410(A) (1978)
(this provision is more restrictive than the Model Penal Code); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
707(2)(b) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. ]1, § 467(c) (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307(3)
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 503.090(2) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(II)(b) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
401(d)(2) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 107(2)(b) (West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.066 (2) (West Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(3)(d) (1979); TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.51(C) (Vernon 1974). Deadly force is allowed only when the felon uses
physical force to flee or has the capacity to use deadly force.
For an example of how an Indiana court has construed the common law statute to a
standard similar to the Model Penal Code, see supra note 91.
Massachusetts, though once a follower of the common law, seems to have adopted
the Model Penal Code limitations with regard to police officers. See Julian v. Randazzo,
380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980).
95. These statutes are known as "forcible felony" laws. See Justifiable Use of
Deadly Force, supra note 71, at 80-81.
96. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (Supp. 1986) (adopting the forcible felony
approach). "'Forcible felony' means treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggra-
vated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnap-
19861
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legislatures. 7
New York's deadly force statute is illustrative of this "list-
ing" characteristic. It authorizes deadly force only when the fel-
ony involves the use of deadly force or the felony is kidnapping,
arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree or
any attempt to commit such a crime.as
3. Case Law Under State Deadly Force Statutes
Despite the fact that courts have repeatedly shown a reluc-
tance to strike down deadly force statutes as unconstitutional,99
cases continue to appear on federal and state court dockets.'00
Typically, these cases are decided on a factual analysis of the
reasonableness of the police officer's conduct, rather than on the
constitutionality of the statute itself. One case in which the stat-
ute was found to be invalid is Mattis v. Schnarr.10 1 There, the
ping, aggravated battery and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physi-
cal force or violence against an individual." Id.
97. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (Smith-Hurd
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7(b)(2) (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1)(a)
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(d) (1985); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 508(a)(1) (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404(2)(b) (1978).
California, has restricted the use of deadly force to only violent felony situations.
See supra note 91.
Louisiana has no law governing the use of deadly force to capture a fleeing felon but
it does have a justifiable homicide statute that allows deadly force to prevent a violent
felony. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West 1986).
Vermont has no fleeing felon deadly force statute but it does have a justifiable homi-
cide statute that allows deadly force to prevent a homicide. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2305(2) (1974 & Supp. 1984).
98. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986).
99. For a discussion of the cases in which challenges to police use of deadly force
under state statutes have been repeatedly dismissed, see infra notes 117-44 and accom-
panying text. But see infra notes 101-16, 148-49 and accompanying text (cases where
these challenges under state deadly force statutes were successful).
100. For a review of these cases, see infra notes 101-44 and accompanying text.
101. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976). In this case, the suspected felon, eighteen-year
old Michael Mattis, and a friend were discovered at a golf driving range office at 1:20
a.m. As police arrived, the two climbed out a back window. Defendant, Officer Schnarr,
shouted at the boys to stop. When they did not, he gave a warning, "Halt or I'll shoot."
He fired one shot into the air and one toward the boys. Meanwhile, defendant Officer
Marek collided with Mattis as he came around the corner of the building. After a slight
scuffle, Mattis broke loose and began to escape once again. Marek, believing he needed to
do something more to prevent escape, warned Mattis to stop or he would shoot. He shot
in Mattis' direction. Mattis was hit and later died.
The father of the suspect brought a suit against the officers and the City of Olivette
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/4
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Eighth Circuit held that deadly force could not constitutionally
be used to effect the arrest of a fleeing burglar who did not
threaten life during the commission of the crime and who posed
no threat to the pursuing officers."0 2 The court reasoned that the
Missouri statute created a presumption that all fleeing felons are
dangerous to society and officers; the statute was a violation of
the suspect's fourteenth amendment due process rights. 0 3
Taking notice of the erosion of the common law rationale on
the use of deadly force, the court in Mattis rejected the rule. 10 4
The court turned to a balancing of both the suspect's and the
state's interests to determine if the use of such severe force was
justified. Finding no compelling state interest to justify the tak-
ing of Mattis' life, the court invalidated the Missouri statute as a
violation of the individual's due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment.'0 5
Subsequent to Mattis, °e the same court decided Landrum
v. Moats,07 .a Nebraska case in which the plaintiff's allegation
also prevailed; but here the court looked only to the conduct of
the officer.108 The suspect, Landrum, was shot in the back as he
fled from the scene of a burglary. 0 9 The Eighth Circuit found
the Nebraska officer's actions to be an unreasonable use of
deadly force against the suspect. 0 The court of appeals held
that because the officer did not believe that the crime commit-
ted involved the use or threatened use of deadly force or that
alleging deprivation of Michael's eighth, ninth, and fourteenth (due process and equal
protection) amendment rights. The father sought monetary damages and a ruling that
the Missouri statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 1009-10.
102. Id. at 1020.
103. Id. at 1019. The presumption created by the statute violated the suspect's four-
teenth amendment due process rights by depriving him of his right to a trial before he
was deprived of his life.
104. Id. at 1016.
105. Compare Mattis at 1019 with Wiley, 548 F.2d 1247 and Jones, 528 F.2d 132
(similar statutes upheld under a due process challenge).
Mattis was later vacated as moot per curium sub nom., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S.
171 (1977) (decision on jurisdictional power was vacated on procedural grounds). None-
theless, Mattis has continued as persuasive authority in subsequent litigation challenging
the constitutionality of deadly force statutes.
106. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976).
107. 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
108. Id. at 1324.
109. Id. at 1323.




Landrum would cause serious harm if not immediately appre-
hended, the officer did not meet the prerequisites for the use of
deadly force, and therefore, his actions were unreasonable.111 Be-
cause the officer's actions were found to be unreasonable, the
court never reached the constitutionality of this deadly force
statute.
Similarly, in Clark v. Ziedonis,"2 a challenge to the officer's
use of deadly force was successful wherein the officer's conduct
was found unreasonable when he shot and wounded two youths
as they fled from the officer.'1 3 Plaintiffs brought suit against the
officer for violations of their civil rights under the eighth, ninth,
and fourteenth amendments."" It was established that the area
was well-lit and that the plaintiffs were a short distance away
from the officer at the time of the shooting."' On these facts, the
court found that the officer could not reasonably have believed
that excessive force was needed."' Again, the statute's constitu-
tionality was never addressed.
In Cunningham v. Ellington,' 7 the District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee, found Tennessee's deadly force
statute constitutional. The decedent was shot and killed as he
fled from a burglary attempt."' Suit was brought challenging
the constitutionality of the statute and alleging violation of de-
111. Id. at 1326. Moats admitted that he did not believe that the crime committed
involved the use or threatened use of deadly force or that Landrum would cause danger-
ous harm if not immediately apprehended, as was required by the Nebraska statute. Id.
Because the trial jury failed to find the conduct unreasonable under the circum-
stances, the verdict was unsupported by the evidence and the court of appeals reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1330-31.
112. 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1975).
113. The youths were 13 and 14 years old. They had been ringing the front and back
doorbells of a house, and the owner called the police. When the boys saw the police they
began to run away. Believing they attempted to commit a burglary, the officer pursued
them and ordered them to halt. Upon a second halt order, one of the boys turned to-
wards the officer, wielding a 12-inch file which the officer said he believed was a gun. The
officer then fired a warning shot over his head. The boy turned towards him again and at
that instant the officer fired a second time, wounding both boys. They were about 45 feet
away from the officer and in a well-lit area when the officer shot at them. Id. at 80.
114. Id. at n.1.
115. Id. at 82.
116. Id. at 81.
117. 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).




cedent's constitutional rights under the eighth'19 and four-
teenth'20 amendments.''
The court determined that the deadly force statute, as con-
strued by Tennessee state courts,122 was constitutional because
it limited the use of deadly force by an officer against an escap-
ing suspect to only those instances where three requirements
were met. The officer must: (1) reasonably believe a felony was
committed, (2) give an arrest warning, and (3) reasonably be-
lieve no means less than such force will prevent escape. 2 ' The
court held further that there was no violation of the eighth
amendment; 2 4 that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague; and that it did not violate the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. 12 5
A few years later, the constitutionality of the same Tennes-
see statute was again upheld in Wiley v. Memphis Police De-
partment.' Here the decedent was shot and killed as he ran
from the scene of a burglary at a sporting goods store. 127 Wiley's
mother instituted suit against both the officer and the police de-
partment seeking monetary damages and a determination that
the statute violated her son's fourth, 28 fifth, sixth, eighth, thir-
teenth, and fourteenth amendment rights. 2 9 Recognizing the
threat posed by burglary and the need to leave assessment of
state and individual interests to the legislature, the Sixth Circuit
refused to follow the decision in Mattis and upheld the constitu-
119. This constitutional provision protects against cruel and unusual punishment.
120. This constitutional provision protects against a violation of due process rights.
121. 323 F. Supp. at 1075-76.
122. The statute was construed as a codification of the common law. See Scarbrough
v. State, 168 Tenn. 106, 76 S.W.2d 106 (1934); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94
(1922); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
123. Cunningham, 323 F. Supp. at 1074-75.
124. The court stated that there simply was no punishment issue to address. Id. at
1075.
125. Id. at 1076.
126. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
127. Id. at 1248.
128. The fourth amendment challenge was dismissed as meritless at the trial level.
The appellate court never addressed the issue. See Note, The Unconstitutional Use of
Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Fleeing Felons: Garner v. Memphis Police Depart-
ment, 18 GA. L. REV. 137, 155 (1983).




tionality of the statute.13
In the years between Cunningham and Wiley, Connecticut's
deadly force statute withstood constitutional challenge in Jones
v. Marshall.131 This case involved a high speed car chase follow-
ing a suspected auto theft.1 32 The suspects fled from the car and
refused to heed the officer's orders to halt. The officer subse-
quently shot at the felons which resulted in the death of
Jones.13 3 Suit was brought alleging violation of the decedent's
fourteenth amendment due process rights and seeking declara-
tory judgment that the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional
as it permitted arbitrary imposition of death by officers.13 4
The court refused to accept the Model Penal Code as the
constitutional standard by which to judge the statute, believing
that to do so would be judicial legislating.13 5 Instead, it balanced
the interests of the state and of the individual, ultimately find-
ing that the statute was not fundamentally unfair. 136
Many other challenges to police use of deadly force have
failed because the suits were dismissed on the ground that the
officers' actions were reasonable. In Beech v. Melancon,13 7 the
officer's use of deadly force against suspected felons fleeing from
a gas station burglary was held to be reasonable. In this case the
concurring judge expressly reserved decision on the constitution-
ality of the authorizing statute explaining that the facts did not
give rise to such an issue.1 38
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Quails v. Parrish,139 dis-
missed constitutional challenges to Tennessee's deadly force
statute by finding that the officer had probable cause to believe
a felonious assault had occurred.1 40 Consequently, his actions
130. Id. at 1254.
131. 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 133-34.
133. Id. at 134.
134. Id. at 136 n.9.
135. Id. at 142.
136. Id.
137. 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
138. 465 F.2d at 426-27 (6th Cir. 1972) (McCree, J., concurring).
139. 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 693. Just earlier the same night, Sheriff Parrish had gotten a call about a
woman being dragged at gunpoint by Wilbur Ellis. Id. at 692. Parrish had the call as-
signed to Officers French and Long, who happened to know Ellis. The officers were sit-




were found reasonable under the circumstances and his use of
deadly force justified.14,
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
found the officer's use of deadly force reasonable in Smith v.
Jones, when the plaintiff's son tried to run the officer down with
a car.142 The plaintiff's suit, alleging deprivation of her son's due
process rights, was dismissed.14 The court found that the de-
fendant had reasonable grounds to believe the deceased commit-
ted a felony and that no other means of apprehending the sus-
pect were available.14 4 Under Tennessee law, his use of deadly
force was reasonable and no judgment on the statute's constitu-
tionality was ever reached.
The fourth amendment is primarily addressed to police con-
duct. It would logically follow that challenges to the use of
deadly force by the police would be made, first and foremost,
under the fourth amendment. 45 However, the fourth amend-
ment, in and of itself, has been virtually ineffective when used to
challenge the validity of deadly force statutes.'4  In one of the
at a Chrysler-Dodge dealership. The same car had been reported seen in the vicinity of
the abduction. Quick acceleration of the car further strengthened the officers' suspicions.
Id. The court found these facts to be sufficient to establish that the officers had probable
cause to believe criminal activity was occurring. Id. at 693.
141. Id. at 694-95.
142. 379 F. Supp. 201, 202-03 (M.D. Tenn. 1973). Here, the plaintiff and friends had
driven a police car a few blocks from where it was parked. The defendant officer, locating
the car, approached it. Beside the police car was parked plaintiffs station wagon. One of
the station wagon's occupants fled on foot upon seeing the officer. The officer stood in
front of the station wagon and ordered the plaintiff and the other occupant to halt. Hav-
ing moved into the driver's seat, plaintiff accelerated and drove towards the officer. At
this time the officer fired two shots through the windshield and four more after he
jumped out of the car's path. Plaintiff was fatally injured. Id.
143. Id. at 205.
144. Id. at 204-05.
145. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text (discussion of the purpose and
scope of the fourth amendment).
146. The fourth amendment has been a successful avenue for challenges to the use
of excessive force, as distinguished from deadly force, by police. Such force has been
found to make the arrest an unreasonable seizure. See, e.g., Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d
1098, 1102 (7th Cir. 1977) (police provocation of a fight with citizens gave rise to a cause
of action); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (officer beats suspect
with brass knuckles), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973); Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 213
(D.D.C. 1975) (unreasonable search and seizure found where there were beatings and




few instances when a challenge to police use of deadly force was
successfully lodged solely on fourth amendment grounds, the
court's ruling in favor of the plaintiff was based on the unrea-
sonable use of force by the officer. 147 In Jenkins v. Averett," 8
the defendant officer recklessly shot an individual who did not
commit a crime. Because this was a seizure, Jenkins was pro-
tected from such reckless force under the fourth amendment.14 9
Thus, the officer's unreasonable force required a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff; the constitutionality of North Carolina's
deadly force statute was never adjudicated. There had never
been a successful challenge to a state deadly force statute on
fourth amendment grounds until Garner.
III. The Case
A. The Facts
On October 3, 1974, at about 10:45 p.m., Memphis Police
Officers Hymon and Wright were dispatched to respond to a
burglary call.' 50 Upon arrival, a neighbor told the officers she
heard glass crashing and that "they" were breaking in next
door. '5 While Officer Wright made the usual procedural location
call to the dispatcher, Officer Hymon went around to the back of
the house. 152
Officer Hymon next heard a door slam and witnessed some-
one running across the yard. 53 With the aid of his flashlight
Hymon located a figure, Garner, crouched against the fence.'"
The officer testified that he could not be certain whether Garner
was armed. 55 Hymon ordered Garner to stop and took a few
steps toward the suspect.' Garner then climbed the fence in an
147. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).
148. 424 F.2d 1228.
149. Id. at 1231-32.




154. Id. Garner was a 15 year-old youth. Id.
155. Id. However, Officer Hymon is attributed with saying that he was reasonably





effort to escape.1 5 7 Believing Garner would escape if he went
over the fence, Hymon shot and fatally wounded him. 158 Ten
dollars and a purse were found on the felon's body. 59 The sus-
pect's father filed suit against both the city and the officers,
seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983160 for violation of his
son's constitutional rights.16'
B. Procedural History
The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
dismissed the suit against the city, the officers, and their superi-
ors, holding that the city was immune from liability 62 and that
the officers were relieved from liability because they relied in
good faith on the validity of Tennessee's deadly force statute.163
The decision giving the city immunity was based on Monroe v.
Pape,64 which held that a city is immune from liability for civil
rights violations resulting from activities conducted according to
a city custom or policy. 6 5 Under Monroe a city was not a person
for purposes of civil rights violations. Garner's father appealed.
Before this first appeal, Monroe was overruled in part by
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 6' which held that a
city was a person for purposes of a section 1983167 action. Based
on this change in law, the court of appeals in Garner reversed
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1697-98.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisidic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
161. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1698. Garner's father alleged that his son's fourth, fifth,
sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendment rights were violated. See supra notes 1-5 for
the pertinent text of these amendments.
162. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 242 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. Id.
164. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
165. Id. at 187.
166. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). MoneUI is applicable because Garner's father alleged that
his son's constitutional rights were violated as a result of policy or custom followed by
the city police.
167. See supra note 160.
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and remanded the case against the city for decision by the dis-
trict court.'6 On remand, the district court heard arguments for
reopening but dismissed the case on the grounds that the consti-
tutional issues had been adjudicated in earlier cases6 9 which up-
held the constitutionality of state statutes authorizing the use of
deadly force by police officers. Five months later the district
court granted a motion for reconsideration and considered fur-
ther offerings of proof by the defendant; the case was again dis-
missed.17 0 While it affirmed its decision that the city was not
immune from liability, the district court did not resolve the is-
sue of whether the city could claim immunity based on its good
faith reliance on previous federal and state interpretations of the
Tennessee law. 171
The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The three judge panel,1 7 1 on reconsideration, reversed the
district court's decision and remanded the case back to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings.17 3 It held: (1) that the city
was not immune from liability under the civil rights statute,174
and (2) that Tennessee's fleeing felon statute was unconstitu-
tional under the fourth, 17  and fourteenth1 7 6 amendments.
168. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
The court of appeals directed the district court to consider the following issues on
remand: (1) whether the city had a qualified immunity or privilege based on good faith;
(2) whether the municipality's use of deadly force under state law was permissible; (3)
whether use of hollow point bullets was constitutionally permissible; and (4) whether the
officer's conduct flowed from policy or custom for which the city could be held liable. Id.
at 242.
169. Id. Fora discussion of those cases see supra notes 117-44 and accompanying
text.
170. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d at 242.
171. Id. at 242-43. The district court held that the city was barred from claiming
immunity from liability based on the good faith reliance of its agents under Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). However, the court left open the issue of whether
the city could claim immunity based on the city's good faith reliance on the Tennessee
statute as interpreted by federal and state courts.
172. These justices were Chief Judge Edwards, Circuit Judge Keith and Circuit
Judge Merritt. Circuit Judge Merritt delivered the opinion of the court.
173. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d at 249.
174. Id. at 248.
175. The court said the statute authorized an unreasonable seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment.
176. Id. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated.
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IV. The Supreme Court Decision
A. Majority
The six-member majority 17 addressed the issue of whether
the Tennessee statute authorizing the use of deadly force to pre-
vent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon was constitutional.
The Court held that it was unconstitutional insofar as the stat-
ute authorized the use of deadly force against a nonviolent flee-
ing felon.1 78
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that when
deadly force is used to apprehend a suspect, it is a seizure sub-
ject to the restrictions of the fourth amendment.17 9 Applying the
fourth amendment reasonableness test, the majority weighed the
individual's interest in life against the state's interest in effective
law enforcement."" The Court sought to determine whether the
state's interests were of such a compelling nature to justify the
killing of a fleeing felon. It held that they were not."'
The Court conceded that the state had an interest in effec-
tive law enforcement but concluded that the use of deadly force
did not further that interest. It reasoned that the privilege to
use deadly force was a self-defeating law enforcement prac-
tice. 182 If effectively used, the practice would never put the crim-
inal justice system into motion simply because there would be
no suspects to bring to trial. The Court concluded that the
threat of deadly force failed to have a positive effect on arrest
rates. 83 The fact that police were allowed to use deadly force
against fleeing felons under certain circumstances did not deter
escape attempts. Lastly, the Court pointed to the trend among
police departments to adopt policies forbidding the use of
deadly force against nonviolent fleeing felons. Such policies were
often similar to the Model Penal Code.'8 The Court interpreted
177. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
178. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1701 (1985).'
179. Id. at 1699.
180. For a discussion and illustration of this balancing test, see supra notes 56-68
and accompanying text.
181. Garner at 1700-01.
182. Id.
183. Id.




this trend as an indication that the use of deadly force was not
an essential element of the arrest power in all felony situa-
tions. 85 These more restrictive policies convinced the majority
that its decision would not require police to make "impossible,
split-second evaluations of unknowable facts," as was urged by
the dissent. Weighing the evidentiary considerations, the Court
stated: "Petitioners and appellants have not persuaded us that
shooting non-dangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to out-
weigh the suspect's interest in his own life."""6
The Court turned to an examination of the police proce-
dures used in various jurisdictions in order to determine the rea-
sonableness of the use of deadly force. The Court surveyed the
status of state deadly force statutes and concluded that there
was a trend away from the common law rule on deadly force.187
Many states and their corresponding police units were putting
greater restrictions on the privilege to use deadly force.188 This
strengthened the Court's refusal to find the use of such severe
force against a burglary felon to be reasonable.
The Court recognized the importance of the common law in
the development of the privilege to use deadly force but refused
to construe the fourth amendment in light of the common law
rule. It took notice of the legal and technological changes that
have occurred since the emergence of the common law rule'89
and concluded that the "changes in the legal and technological
context mean [that] the rule is distorted almost beyond recogni-
tion when literally applied."' 90
Finally, the majority affirmed the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that under the facts it was unreasonable for Hymon to be-
185. Garner at 1701.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1703-05. For a discussion of the common law rule see supra notes 70-87.
188. Id. at 1704-05. This greater restriction was accomplished by adoption of the
Model Penal Code as the rule for the use of deadly force. For a discussion of the Model
Penal Code, see supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
189. Id. at 1702-03. For a discussion of these changes since the common law rule was
first instituted, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. Although the Court noted
that the sophistication of weaponry eroded the rationale behind the common law rule, it
failed to consider the increased availability of handguns and other weapons to criminals.
This increased use of guns by criminals (violent and nonviolent) has created a great risk
of danger to the police and the public. See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 140 (2d Cir.
1975).




lieve that deadly force was necessary to prevent Garner's es-
cape. 19'1 Garner's physical characteristics such as his small size 192
and young age, 19 3 combined with the fact that he was unarmed,
made it unreasonable for the officer to perceive him as threaten-
ing. The majority admitted that burglary was a serious crime
but refused to characterize it as so serious that it would auto-
matically justify the use of deadly force."9 4 Absent any other cir-
cumstances, the majority held that Hymon did not have proba-
ble cause to believe that Garner posed a threat to him or others,
thereby making the use of deadly force unreasonable. 95 The
Court held Tennessee's deadly force statute unconstitutional
and remanded the issue of the city's and the police department's
liability for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.' 9
B. Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice O'Connor,' 97 held that Of-
ficer Hymon's conduct was reasonable and that the Tennessee
deadly force statute should not be held unconstitutional. The
dissent addressed a narrower issue than the one decided by the
majority. It considered whether the use of deadly force to appre-
hend a suspect was constitutional when the suspect resisted ar-
rest by attempting to flee the scene of a nighttime burglary. 98
Justice O'Connor criticized the generality of the majority's fram-
ing of the issue, arguing that it led to a decision not tailored to
the facts of the case. 199 Emphasizing that a ruling on the stat-
ute's constitutionality could not be made on the facts as they
appeared through hindsight, 00 the dissent turned to the facts in
191. Id. at 1706.
192. That Officer Hymon knew Garner was small in size is in controversy. He
claimed Garner was 5'5" or 5'7" tall. Id. at 1697.
193. Officer Hymon's perception of Garner's age also contradicts the fact that the
suspect was only 15 years old. The officer claimed he thought Garner was an adult. Id. at
1708.
194. Id. at 1706. But see infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (persuasive evi-
dence contradicting this characterization of burglary).
195. Garner at 1706.
196. Id. at 1707.
197. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
198. Id. at 1709 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1708.
200. Id. at 1709, 1711. In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the importance of this pro-
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order to recreate the context in which Hymon acted.2 0' Justice
O'Connor concluded that Hymon's conduct was not clearly
unreasonable.2 2
Critically important to the dissent's position was its finding
that burglary20 3 was a much more violent felony than the major-
ity was willing to concede.2 4 The mere potentiality of violence
resulting from burglary was enough to persuade the dissent that
the crime was far from "innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or
'nonviolent.' "o205
The dissent believed that Hymon had probable cause to be-
lieve Garner committed a felony.2 06 Realizing that police must
207 taoften make split-second decisions, and that burglary is a vio-
lent crime, the dissent concluded that Hymon's use of deadly
force was not unreasonable on the facts of this case.20
Notwithstanding its conclusion that Hymon's actions were
reasonable, the dissent conducted its own interest-balancing test
to assess the constitutionality of the statute under the fourth
amendment. Justice O'Connor recognized the suspect's funda-
scription cannot be overstated. In a constitutional analysis the focus must be on the facts
and circumstances as they existed at the time of the officer's actions and on the reasona-
bleness of the officer's actual conduct. Id.
201. Id. at 1708. It was a late night burglary call at a residence. The neighbor said
that "they" were breaking in. Upon arrival, and after seeing signs of forcible entry, the
officer went around the back. He heard a door slam and saw Garner run across the yard.
With only the aid of his flashlight, Hymon located Garner crouched along the fence. The
suspect refused to heed the halt warnings and climbed the fence in an effort to flee.
Believing the suspect would escape, Hymon shot at Garner. The suspect later died. At
trial, Hymon testified that he thought Garner was an adult and could not be certain
whether Garner was armed. Additionally, Hymon had no way of knowing if there were
people in the house or accomplices still around. The dissent based its argument on these
facts. Id.
202. Id. at 1711.
203. Id. at 1709-10.
204. Id. at 1709. The dissent noted that "'[t]hree-fifths of all rapes in the home,
three-fifths of all robberies, and about a third of home aggravated and simple assaults
are committed by burglars.'" (quoting Bureau of Justice Statistics, Household Burglary
1 (1985) (providing statistical data that in 1973-1982, 2.8 million violent crimes were
committed in the course of burglaries)).
205. Id. at 1709 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 316 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)). See also Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 1975) (commenting
on the increased availability of guns to both violent and nonviolent criminals today).
206. Id. at 1712.
207. Id. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (entire rubric of police conduct
requires many on-the-spot decisions by the officer).
208. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1712.
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mental interest in life.20 9 Against this the Justice balanced the
state's interest in protecting the public from dangerous burglary
felons.210 The dissent found a compelling state interest in facili-
tating the detection and apprehension of burglary felons.211 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that this imperative state interest justi-
fied the corresponding intrusion into the suspect's life.2 12
The dissent criticized the majority opinion as being vague
on two critical factors.1 3 First, the majority failed to give guid-
ance as to which of a myriad of potentially lethal weapons would
justify the use of deadly force. Its provision that an officer may
use deadly force only when a suspect threatens him with a
deadly weapon requires the officer to make another judgment as
to whether an object is a weapon.21 " Considering that the objects
could range from bats to guns, the majority's failure to indicate
what objects qualify as deadly weapons made the restriction am-
biguous.21 ' Second, the dissent criticized the majority's conclu-
sion that probable cause to arrest and the suspect's refusal to
halt in the course of a potentially violent crime were insufficient
for believing the suspect threatened harm. The dissent read the
conclusion as mandating a higher level of probable cause and
criticized the majority for neglecting to enumerate the addi-
tional factors necessary to establish the elevated conception of
"probable cause" that the majority obviously required."' Justice
O'Connor argued that the majority's vagueness on these two
conclusions made the police officer's decision of whether to use
deadly force even more difficult. Based on these reasons, the dis-
senters would have found the officer's conduct reasonable.
209. Id. at 1710.
210. Id.
211. Id. For a discussion of the seriousness of burglary, see infra notes 251-55 and
accompanying text.
212. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1710.
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V. Analysis
A. Limitations on Police Discretion
The Supreme Court concluded that Tennessee's deadly
force statute gave police unfettered discretion in the use of
deadly force and that it authorized the use of deadly force
against nonviolent fleeing felons. 217 The Court correctly observed
that the statute failed to distinguish between violent and nonvi-
olent felonies. It appears that the Court believed this broadness
and vagueness transformed the privilege to use deadly force into
a license to kill.218
Although the language of the statute itself does not restrict
the discretion of police,21 9 other factors did impose restraints on
the use of deadly force.220 For example, because Tennessee's
statute was a codification of the common law rule,2 the use of
deadly force was restricted by the same limitations existing at
common law. Thus, deadly force could be resorted to only when
necessary and when no other means for apprehension were avail-
able.222 The Tennessee courts have imposed the "necessary" and
"last resort" requirements in deciding the lawfulness of police
conduct.2
23
217. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1701, 1707 (1985).
218. While the Court refrained from labelling the statute as a license for law en-
forcement officers to kill, this perception can be inferred. The Court reasoned that the
statute permitted "the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects,
whatever the circumstances .... Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701 (emphasis added).
219. For the full text of the statute, see supra note 8. The statute did not incorpo-
rate defined instances for the use of deadly force which would necessarily reduce the
scope of police discretion.
220. See infra notes 221-43 and accompanying text.
221. Tennessee courts have continuously construed the statute in this manner. See
infra note 223 and cases cited therein.
222. See Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, supra note 71, at 69-70.
223. See, e.g., Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976): "However, an 'officer
has no absolute right to kill either to take, or prevent the escape of, a prisoner. If with
diligence and caution the prisoner might otherwise be taken or held, the officer will not
be justified for the killing, even though the prisoner may have committed a felony.' "
Id. at 693 (quoting Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 529-30, 238 S.W. 94, 96 (1922)); Scar-
brough v. State, 168 Tenn. 106, 76 S.W.2d 106 (1934) (Applying the common law limita-
tions, the court held that the officer's use of deadly force violated Tennessee's statute in
the absence of a showing that such force was necessary to capture the felon. The court
stated: "but the law does not clothe an officer or private person with authority to arbi-
trarily judge the necessity of killing, and such a course must be the last resort. Id.
at 110, 76 S.W.2d at 107 (emphasis added)).
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The Memphis police shooting policy 22' is another source of
limitation on the officer's discretion to use deadly force. The ma-
jority reviewed the policy and recognized that it was more re-
strictive than the statute in limiting the instances in which
deadly force could be used against fleeing felons.225 The Court
also recognized the trend among police departments226 to adopt
similarly more restrictive shooting policies2 27 The Court relied
on this trend as an indication that limiting the use of deadly
force did not impede effective law enforcement.22 8 However, the
Court failed to consider the effect of these policies in limiting
the scope of the discretion exercised by the officer.
Many courts have been asked to apply police department
regulations as the standard to assess the reasonableness of an
officer's conduct. Although some courts refuse to use the regula-
tions as the standard to determine the criminal or civil liability
of the officer, 229 others find them to be an appropriate considera-
224. The Memphis Police Department Shooting Policy reads:
Deadly Force: DEADLY FORCE may be used in the following circumstances only
after all other reasonable means to apprehend or otherwise prevent the offense
have been exhausted:
(a) Self-Defense. An officer may use DEADLY FORCE when it is in the defense of
himself or another from serious bodily injury or death and the threat of serious
bodily injury or death is real and immediate.
(b) Felonies Involving the Use or Threatened Use of Physical Force. An officer
may use DEADLY FORCE when the offense involves a felony and the suspect
uses or attempts to use or threatens the use of physical force against any person.
(c) Other Felonies Where DEADLY FORCE is Authorized. After all reasonable
means of preventing or apprehending a suspect have been exhausted, DEADLY
FORCE is authorized in the following crimes: (a) kidnapping, (b) murder in the
first or second degree, (c) manslaughter, (d) arson (including the use of fire
bombs), (e) rape, (f) assault and battery with intent to carnally know a child
under 12 years of age, (g) assault and battery with intent to commit rape, (h)
burglary in the first, second or third degree, (i) assault to commit murder in the
first or second degree, (j) assault to commit voluntary manslaughter, (k) armed
and simple robbery. ...
Reply Brief Of Petitioners at 3-5, Memphis Police Dep't v. Garner, 710 F.2d 240 (6th
Cir. 1983).
225. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1705.
226. Id. See also Wukitsch, Survey of the Law Governing Police Use of Deadly
Force, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1983, at 12, 15 (survey of police department shooting
regulations).
227. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1705-06.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mayone, 599 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (police regu-
lations do not define what is excessive force for purposes of constitutional analysis be-
1986] 703
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tion in evaluating the reasonableness of an officer's actions.230 In
either case, the courts have continuously stated that violation of
the police procedures subjects the officer to disciplinary action
within the department, which could be as severe as dismissal. 3 '
Arguably, the threat of disciplinary sanctions curbs the free use
of deadly force. The risk of losing one's job or blemishing one's
record has the potential to make an officer hesitate before violat-
ing a departmental shooting policy.23 2
As previously noted, the Memphis Police Department
Shooting Policy 233 restricted the use of deadly force more than
the Tennessee statute did. It permitted deadly force in self-de-
fense, when the officer reasonably believed the felony committed
involved a threat of serious bodily harm, or in other particular
cause the Constitution could require more or less than such administrative regulations);
City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, 330 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
Reed v. St. Petersburg, 341 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1976) (police regulations are not the stan-
dard to test reasonableness of actions); Chastain v. Civil Service Board, 327 So. 2d 230,
232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (police department rules on the use of deadly force are not
the appropriate standards for deciding criminal or civil liability).
230. See, e.g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1162-63 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 587-88, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465, 480, 468 P.2d 825,
831 (1970) (The courts stated that police regulations on deadly force, especially if more
restrictive than the state's statute, are appropriate to consider when determining the
reasonableness of the officer's conduct.). See also Wukitsch, Survey of the Law Gov-
erning Police Use of Deadly Force, N.Y. ST. B.J., JAN. 1983 at 12, 15 (more restrictive
police policies could open officer up to additional liability).
231. Chastain v. Civil Service Board, 327 So. 2d 230, 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(police officer who shot and wounded escaping prisoner in violation of department shoot-
ing policy and without first exhausting all other means of apprehension was dismissed
from the police force).
232. The deterrent effect of shooting policies has been commented on a number of
times. See, e.g., State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, n.22 (Alaska 1980) (mentioning that
police department proceedings are an alternative source of deterrence of illegal police
conduct besides the exclusionary rule; however, the effectiveness of these proceedings as
a deterrent is in debate). See also Wukitsch, Survey of the Law Governing Police Use of
Deadly Force, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1983, at 12, 15 ("Notwithstanding the possible conflict
between state law and departmental regulations, departmental regulations may be the
most desirable means for controlling the use of deadly force."); Bouza, Myths And Hard
Truths About Police Shootings, 13 TOLEDO L. REv. 337, 341 (1982) (Institution of more
restrictive departmental regulations has shown a significant impact on the incidence of
police shootings. The policies are very effective in reducing indiscriminate and frequent
use of firearms by police.); Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 416-29 (argument is made that
constitutional protection against the use of deadly force lies most effectively in a formu-
lation of police shooting policies and administrative regulations rather than more restric-
tive statutes).
233. For the full text of the policy, see supra note 224.
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felony situations.234 In each instance, all other means of appre-
hending the felon must have been exhausted.23 5 The restrictive
effect of this policy warranted a closer inspection by the Court
in order to ascertain a more realistic picture of the discretion
police actually had.
Clearly, the Court's major concern was that the statute gave
police unlimited discretion because it granted the police permis-
sion to "use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." 36 The
Court interpreted this clause to permit any amount of force
under any circumstances and for this reason held the statute un-
constitutional.237 However, the Court neglected to consider that
the conduct authorized by the Tennessee statute,238 was limited
by the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment.239
The Tennessee court had continuously construed the statute to
allow only that force which was reasonable under the circum-
stances.240 Thus, one court found deadly force against a fleeing
misdemeanant unreasonable.242 When an officer's use of force
was excessive, and therefore unreasonable, the officer would be
penalized.24 2 In effect, the reasonableness requirement func-
tioned as a further limitation on the degree of force an officer
234. These include: (a) kidnapping, (b) murder in the first or second
degree, (c) manslaughter, (d) arson (including the use of fire bombs), (e) rape, (f) assault
and battery with intent to carnally know a child under 12 years of age, (g) assault and
battery with intent to commit rape, (h) burglary in the first, second, or third degree, (i)
assault to commit murder in the first or second degree, (j) assault to commit voluntary
manslaughter, (k) armed and simple robbery. (J.A. 140).
235. For the pertinent section, see supra note 224.
236. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note
8.
237. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701.
238. The Tennessee statute addressed the use of force to effect an arrest. Arrests are
seizures subject to the fourth amendment. Therefore, the seizure addressed in the stat-
ute must meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.
239. For a discussion of the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment,
see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
240. For cases holding that reasonableness is an essential element of constitutional
police conduct, see supra note 48.
241. Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 137, 114 S.W.2d 819, 820 (1938); Reneau v.
State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879).
242. Ford v. Wells, 347 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). Here, the constable
tried to arrest plaintiff for public drunkenness. In his efforts to effectuate the arrest, the
constable knocked the plaintiff down with a black-jack and dragged him with a choker
chain. The court held this to be unreasonable. Id. at 1029-30.
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could legally employ.24 3 The Court's impression that the Tennes-
see statute permitted any force whatsoever, under any circum-
stances, was thus clearly erroneous.
B. The Balancing of Interests
The Court balanced the competing interests of the state and
those of the individual in order to determine whether the degree
of intrusion into the suspect's life could be justified.2" The
Court stated that the suspect's fundamental interest in his own
life was self-evident.2 5 The Court also considered the interest of
the individual and society in a judicial determination of guilt
and of punishment.2 ' On the other side of the scale, a single and
general governmental interest in "effective law enforcement"
was posited.2 4  The Court concluded that shooting a
nondangerous fleeing felon was not "so vital as to outweigh the
suspect's interest in his own life. '248
243. This principle is not at all new to the area of police use of deadly force. When-
ever police conduct is challenged, the first issue to be addressed is whether or not it was
reasonable under the circumstances. If the degree of force is unreasonable, the conduct is
illegal. This is why many challenges to state deadly force statutes are settled before the
constitutionality of the statute is ever reached. For illustrative cases where the constitu-
tionality of the statute was never reached because the reasonableness requirement set-
tled the dispute, see supra notes 106-16, 137-49 and accompanying text.
Based on dictum in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (which
stated that the more serious the intrusion the more stringent the protections of the
fourth amendment must become), an argument has been made that the fourth amend-
ment reasonableness requirement is an insufficient limitation on the use of deadly force.
The proponent of this argument suggests that because the use of deadly force is the most
intrusive conduct into the individual's life, more than the standard fourth amendment
reasonableness requirement is needed. See also Mogin, The Policeman's Privilege to
Shoot a Fleeing Suspect: Constitutional Limits on the Use of Deadly Force, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 533, 537, 543-44 (1981).
244. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700. The balancing test is the fourth amendment consti-
tutionality test. For a discussion of the test and the recurrent problems faced as a conse-
quence of its implementation, see supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
245. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700. The individual's fundamental right to life is rooted
in the history of the due process and equal protection clauses. For cases holding that the
right to life is fundamental, see supra note 66.
246. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700.
247. Id. An articulation of "effective law enforcement" was not found anywhere in
the Court's opinion. Because the concept is so broad it is difficult to ascertain just ex-
actly what the majority considered to be the essential elements of "effective law
enforcement."
248. Id. at 1701.
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The state's interest in effective law enforcement is arguably
equivalent to the individual's fundamental interest in his own
life but not as evident. Certainly, this interest is more complex
than simply collaring criminals, and, therefore, necessitates a de-
tailed examination. Courts and scholars have been more profi-
cient in specifically articulating the composition of "effective law
enforcement" than was the Supreme Court in Garner.249 In fact,
the Court never addressed what it actually considered "effective
law enforcement" to mean.2 50 By failing to conduct a more ade-
quate analysis of this governmental interest, it is therefore un-
clear whether the identification and balancing of the state's and
individual's interests were effectively achieved.
A significant flaw in the majority's analysis was its failure to
significantly address the propensity of violence associated with
burglary. Statistics indicate that many violent crimes result in
the course of burglaries. Burglary felons are responsible for
three-fifths of all rapes in the home, for three-fifths of all home
robberies, and for one-third of all home aggravated and simple
assaults .2 5  The majority responded that these statistics only
showed that when there was violence in the home, often a bur-
glar was also present.2 52 However, it refused to view these num-
bers as an indication of the degree of violence associated with
the felony.2 5 Although different conclusions can be drawn from
these statistics, it is clear that there is a cognizable degree of
violence accompanying burglary. In addition, case law dealing
with grossly violent crimes supports the proposition that bur-
glary often results in violence.2 54
249. Among the legitimate governmental interests that have been identified are the
public safety and security, protection of the criminal justice system, protection of the
officer's own life and the impact of crime on society and the individual. For a discussion
of governmental interests that have been defined by courts and scholars, see supra notes
60-64 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 247.
251. See supra note 204.
252. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1707 n.23.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 316 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)
(burglary possesses a harsh potentiality for violence such that it can hardly be described
as "innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or 'non-violent' "); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S.
355, 358 (1981); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 435 (1981); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 245 (1976) (all involving criminals convicted of burglary that resulted in mur-




Many state statutes adopting the most restrictive rule on
the use of deadly force include burglary among those felonies
against which deadly force can be used.255 Clearly, the legisla-
tures of those states concluded that burglary is a violent felony
involving the threat of harm.
In the balancing test, the weight assigned to each interest is
inextricably linked to the nature and dangerousness of the of-
fense. The characterization of the nature of burglary was, there-
fore, critical to a fair balancing of interests.5 6 When viewed gen-
erally as a nonviolent felony, the use of deadly force in a
burglary setting is obviously too severe an intrusion on the indi-
vidual's fundamental interest in life. However, when the violent
propensities associated with burglary are recognized, the state's
interest in "effective law enforcement" takes on a new meaning.
Burglars put the public and police officers in great danger and
the state's interest in protecting both from dangerous burglary
felons is compelling. Therefore, authorization of the use of
deadly force, as a means of protecting both the public and po-
lice, could reasonably be found to justify the intrusion into the
suspect's life.
The majority's failure to examine comprehensively the sub-
stance of "effective law enforcement" and to recognize the high
rate of violence associated with burglary impeded an adequate
(burglary, breaking and entering and grand larceny are serious offenses that involve the
potentiality of violence and danger to life as well as property); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513
F.2d 79, 82-83 n.10 (7th Cir. 1975) (In discussing the status of deadly force in other
states, this court observes "that burglary is one of the 'serious' or 'dangerous' felonies
which give rise to the privilege to use deadly force under the modified rule."); State v.
Nyland, 47 Wash. 2d 240, 242, 287 P.2d 345, 347 (1955) (Burglary is among those felonies
committed by violence and surprise which warrant the use of deadly force if necessary to
repel them.). See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1110 (3d ed. 1982) (Bur-
glary is a dangerous felony that creates an unreasonable risk of great personal harm.).
255. See supra note 97 (states adopting the forcible felony rule on the use of deadly
force).
256. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701. The Court's divided decision illustrates this. The
majority considered burglary generally a nonviolent felony. Consequently, the only state
interest it considered to have any weight at all was police enforcement. The Court hardly
thought the public's or officer's personal safety was relevant. This was because burglary
was believed to pose no danger. Id. On the other hand, the dissent interpreted burglary
as involving a high propensity of violence. From there it examined and assigned a weight
to the state's interest in protecting the personal safety of the public and officers. The
dissent argued that the state exhibited a compelling interest that justified the use of




assessment and balancing of interests. Thus, the majority's hold-
ing that a statute authorizing the use of deadly force against
burglary felons is unconstitutional on the grounds that an indi-
vidual's interest in life clearly outweighs the state's interest in
"effective law enforcement," is itself infirm.
C. The Unreasonableness of the Officer's Actions
The Court held that "Officer Hymon could not reasonably
have believed that Garner... posed any threat. '2 57 The majority
relied on the fact that Garner was slight, unarmed and had com-
mitted only a petty theft. 58 Determination of the reasonableness
of conduct under the fourth amendment requires a complete
evaluation of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the
time of the incident.' An after-the-fact interpretation of the
circumstances plays no part in this evaluation. The incident at
issue did not occur in the controlled setting of the courtroom;
rather, it happened in the course of an officer's "night on the
beat." The actions of Officer Hymon must be examined in this
context with the caveat that police officers must make sudden
on-the-spot decisions, many of which are a matter of life and
death.260
The material facts at issue in this case were Garner's exact
size and age and whether he was armed.2 61 Officer Hymon testi-
fied that he could not be sure if Garner had any weapon.26 2 He
said he thought Garner was larger and older than in fact he ac-
tually was.2 3 In addition, Hymon had probable cause to believe
that Garner had committed a felony;2 4 it was a nighttime bur-
glary, there were broken windows, the neighbor said that "they"
were breaking in, and Garner was running away. These were the
257. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1706.
258. Id.
259. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized this principle. See supra note
48.
260. Courts and commentators alike recognize that officers are forced to make quick
decisions in the course of carrying out their duties. See supra note 207. See also Bouza,
Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 13 TOLEDO L. REV. 337, 338 (1982).
261. See supra notes 192-93.
262. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1697.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1712 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of probable cause, see




facts upon which Hymon made the split-second decision to use
deadly force. He fulfilled all the procedural requirements before
he determined that deadly force was necessary. 65 In light of
these facts and circumstances, this author concludes that
Hymon's conduct was reasonable.
D. The Alternative Rule
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that
the rule set out in the Model Penal Code 266 accurately stated
fourth amendment limitations on the use of deadly force against
fleeing felons.2 67 The majority implicitly adopts this rule.6 8
The Model Penal Code allows the use of deadly force only
when the officer or another is threatened with serious bodily
harm or when the officer reasonably believes the crime commit-
ted is a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly
harm.26 While the Model Penal Code has been praised for its
ability to strike an effective balance between the state's and the
individual's interests, 2 0 as applied to this case, it fails to remedy
the infirmities charged against the Tennessee statute.
Although the Supreme Court is correct in its observation
that the Model Penal Code approach is growing in popularity,
7 1
there has not been an abandonment of other rules on deadly
force. The courts of many states have refused to adopt the
Model Penal Code as the constitutional minimum for the use of
265. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1712 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). These procedures were
ordering the suspect to halt and using deadly force only as a last resort. Id.
266. See supra note 92 (pertinent text of the Model Penal Code).
267. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 1983).
268. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701.
269. See supra note 92-93 and accompanying text.
270. See Hilton v. State, 348 A.2d 242, 244 (Me. 1975). At the lower level, the panel
of judges rejected the common law rule on deadly force existing in the state and adopted
the Model Penal Code version because it struck "the appropriate balance between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement and the sanctity of human life." The appellate
court, in reversing the panel's decision, stated that the panel went beyond the appropri-
ate bounds of its judicial function when it abrogated the existing common law rule on
the use of deadly force and adopted the Model Penal Code standard. Id. Finding that
there was an issue of fact to be determined by the jury when the common law rule was
applied, the appellate court remanded the case. Id. at 242.
271. This is a common observation usually based on a comparison of the number of
states following a common law or forcible felony rule. For a list of the states' deadly force
rules, see supra notes 91, 94, and 97.
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deadly force.2 7 2 Likewise, many state legislatures, having had
years to consider the Model Penal Code have explicitly rejected
the rule adopting instead the more restrictive forcible felony
rule2 73 or retaining the common law rule.274
Although supporters of the Code criticize the common law
rule as authorizing a quick disposition of rights absent all consti-
tutional protection which may result in the death of the defend-
ant,275 others oppose adoption of the Code on the grounds that it
encourages the felon to escape:
If we pass [Subsection (d)] we say to the criminal, 'You are fool-
ish. No matter what you have done you are foolish if you submit
to arrest. The officer dare not take the risk of shooting at you. If
you can outrun him, outrun him .... If you are faster than he is
you are free, and God bless you.' 2 7 6
272. See Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1252 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1978); Qualls v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones
v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 140-42 (2d Cir. 1975); Schumann v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446,
466-67, 240 N.W.2d 525, 537 (1976); Hilton v. State, 348 A.2d 242, 244 (Me. 1975). These
courts recognize the serious policy issues behind adoption of a particular deadly force
rule and the corresponding necessity to evaluate the public needs in light of the intrusion
on the individual's life. As one court stated:
It is in the legislative forum that the deterrent effect of the traditional rule may
be evaluated and the law-enforcement policies of this state may be fully debated
and determined. The issues upon which the decision turns are more moral and
sociological than they are legal. The legislature, and not this court, is the proper
decision maker.
Schumann v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446, 466-67, 240 N.W.2d 525, 537 (1976). But see Ja-
cobs v. City of Wichita, 531 F. Supp. 129, 131-32 (D. Kan. 1982) (dictum) (The court
denied a request for declaration that the Kansas deadly force statute was unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that state law did not control the merits of the case. Nonetheless,
the court commented that it would hesitate to adopt the common law deadly force rule
because of technological and legal changes in society which no longer support the ration-
ale behind the rule.).
273. New York adopted the Model Penal Code rule in 1965 but repealed it in 1967
with a statute listing the specific felonies for which deadly force may be used. See N.Y.
Penal Law § 35.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986).
274. See supra note 272 and cases cited therein. But see Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d
1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot per curiam sub noma., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S.
171 (1977). The Missouri legislature had considered a bill in 1975 that could modify the
common law rule in light of the Model Penal Code. The legislature rejected the modifica-
tion. Id. at 1022 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ruled that the existing Missouri statute was unconstitutional and adopted
the Model Penal Code as the constitutional standard. Id. at 1020.
275. Schumann v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446, 465, 240 N.W.2d 525, 536 (1976) (quot-
ing Professor Jerome Mikell, supporter of the Model Penal Code).
276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 307 comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Another reason
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The Court purportedly examined the procedures adopted in
other jurisdictions in order to determine the reasonableness of
the deadly force procedure.2 77 The majority found the supposed
trend to adopt a more restrictive deadly force policy, such as the
Model Penal Code, most persuasive.
The Court's expressed concern over the unrestricted scope
of the privilege to use deadly force as permitted by the statute,
was the original impetus behind the Court's preference toward
the rule in the Model Penal Code. The Court desired to estab-
lish a more definable set of situations for the use of deadly
force. In effect, however, the Code itself does little to remedy
the discretionary problem the Garner Court found so offensive.
Even under the Model Penal Code the decision of whether
to use deadly force still turns on the actor's interpretation of the
situation. The difficult question of whether the officer had a rea-
sonable belief that deadly force was needed still remains. Must
the suspect shoot at the officer? Must the officer witness vio-
lence? The answer to these questions is hardly a burdensome
one to reach when the felony is clearly either violent or nonvio-
lent. Thus, if the crime were murder or, alternatively, tax eva-
sion, determining the reasonableness of the belief would pose lit-
tle difficulty. But most felonies fall somewhere in between. More
particularly, what about burglary? While it is not conclusively a
violent crime, neither can it generally be classified as a nonvio-
lent crime. In situations like this, the Model Penal Code pro-
vides little if any aid to the officer in her determination of
whether to use deadly force. The Court seems to be searching
for a rule that reduces the officer's discretion. Adopting the
frequently cited for refusing to adopt the Model Penal Code is that the American Law
Institute still appears to be groping for a uniform standard. As stated by one court: "The
American Law Institute's almost 50 years of consideration of the problem demonstrates
that the area in which we are treading is one still characterized by shifting sands and
obscured pathways." Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1975).
277. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1703-06. Here, the Court looked at the number of states
adopting the various rules on deadly force and the trend among police departments to
limit the use of deadly force in a more restrictive manner than did the common law.
278. The court held that to allow the use of deadly force in effectuating the arrest of
all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, was constitutionally unreasonable.
Meanwhile, this holding suggests that a more clearly defined set of situations describing
when deadly force could be used would protect the statute from constitutional challenge.
Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701. Reading the dictum in light of the holding, it seems as if the




Model Penal Code under these circumstances can hardly be re-
lied upon to effectuate this goal.
VI. Conclusion
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court, for the first
time, invalidated a state deadly force statute on fourth amend-
ment grounds. The decision rejected a long line of case law tra-
dition which accepted codification of the common law rule. In its
place, the Court adopted a new standard, set forth in the Model
Penal Code, for the use of deadly force by police.
The Court's holding is disturbing. The Court neglected to
recognize a variety of legal operatives that limited police discre-
tion on the use of deadly force. It failed to identify fully the
state's interests and to implement fairly the fourth amendment
balancing test. It minimized the violent propensities inherent in
burglary. As a result, the Court improperly assessed the material
facts and held that an officer's use of deadly force against a flee-
ing burglary suspect was unreasonable. Finally, the Court struck
down Tennessee's deadly force statute substituting a new consti-
tutional standard which failed to cure the deficiencies charged
against the Tennessee statute. It is clear that the Court has dis-
carded a constitutionally sound deadly force statute without suf-
ficient evidentiary support for its holding.
Geraldine N. Lewis
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